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Commercial Law
By LINDA J. PELTIER* AND SUSAN L. COLEMAN**
INTRODUCTION
Recent developments in Kentucky in the area of commer-
cial law demonstrate the growth of two national trends-the
continuing spread of a judicial gloss on the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, and the rapid expansion of the law designed to pro-
tect consumers. The recent efforts of the Kentucky courts and
legislature in these two areas provide the focal point for this
year's survey of Kentucky commercial law.
I. DECISIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
A. Sales of Goods
1. Franchise Agreements
The parties in Leibel v. Raynor Manufacturing Company'
entered into an oral agreement providing for an exclusive
dealer-distributorship of garage doors. Raynor agreed to sell
and deliver its garage doors and parts at factory prices to Leibel
who, in turn, agreed to sell, install, and service these products
exclusively. After two years of dealing under this agreement,
Raynor notified Leibel in writing that the relationship was to
be terminated forthwith due to decreasing sales. Leibel brought
suit against Raynor to enforce the contract, alleging that he
was entitled to reasonable notification of termination and that
he had borrowed substantial sums of money for the purpose of
performing his contract obligations. In its motion for summary
judgment, Raynor argued that since the franchise agreement
was of indefinite duration, either party could terminate it at
will. Leibel insisted that Article Two of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code governed the agreement and required Raynor to give
Leibel reasonable notice of its intention to terminate the agree-
ment. Raynor's motion for summary judgment was granted by
the circuit court, which concluded that Article Two was not
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1970, Bucknell Univer-
sity; J.D. 1973, George Washington University.
** J.D. 1979, University of Kentucky.
I No. CA-1800-MR (Ky. App. June 23, 1978).
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applicable and that, even if it did apply, only actual, as op-
posed to reasonable, notice of the termination was required.
2
On appeal, the court first considered whether a distribu-
torship agreement is a sale of goods subject to the provisions
of Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code.3 In resolving
this issue, the court relied on Buttorff v. United Electronic
Laboratories, Inc.,4 which examined the nature and purpose of
the agreement and the" true intentions of the parties to deter-
mine whether a particular transaction fell within the scope of
Article Two. In Buttorff, a camera salesman compensated on
a commission basis was held to be a party to a contract for
personal services and not a contract for the sale of goods.5 The
Leibel court did not clearly define the difference between a
distributor and a salesman,6 but found that the agreement in
question involved primarily a sale of goods rather than serv-
ices.7 This decision is consistent with the weight of pertinent
authority, which distinguishes distributors and commissioned
salesmen on the basis of the presence of an agreement to pur-
chase goods. "[T]he sales agent derives his income or compen-
sation primarily from commissions on sales promoted and does
not purchase the manufacturer's products, while, on the other
hand, the distributor does make substantial purchases from
the manufacturer for resale to retailers. .. .
Having determined that Leibel was a purchaser of goods,
the court of appeals held that a distributorship agreement for
the sale of goods is governed by Article Two.9 In reaching this
result, the court did not analyze specific Code provisions or
consider whether exclusive dealership, service and installation
2 Id. at 1-3.
s Id. at 3.
459 S.W.2d 581 (Ky. 1970).
Id. at 585.
Leibel v. Raynor Mfg. Co., No. CA-1800-MR at 4 (Ky. App. June 23, 1978).
T Id. at5.
Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 196, 208 (1968). In Louis De Gidio Oil & Gas Burner Sales
& Service, Inc. v. Ace Eng'r Co., 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 801 (Minn. 1974), for example,
the court held that, even though the representative agreement referred to commissions,
the relationship was one of buyer and seller rather than principal and agent, since the
seller had no dealings with ultimate purchasers; the seller billed the dealer, who paid
the seller directly at fixed price; the dealer was never paid on a commission basis; and
the seller did not restrict the dealer's relation with his customers. Id. at 806-07.
9 Leibel v. Raynor Mfg. Co., No. CA-1800-MR at 5 (Ky. App. June 23, 1978).
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provisions of an agreement constitute a "transaction in
goods."' 0 Rather, the court relied on the statement of a noted
Code commentator that "'[w]hen a manufacturer sells its
product to the public through a local dealer, the transaction is
a sale' ,,l regardless of the labels attached by the parties.
Since goods are defined by the Code as "all things . . .
which are movable at the time of identification to the contract
for sale,' 12 the court could have held that Article Two applied
to the sale of the garage doors but did not govern the exclusive
dealership provision and the agreement to install and service
the goods. However, the preferred approach, which comports
with the court's holding in Leibel, employs the "rule of a rea-
sonable characterization of the transaction as a whole." This
rule provides an objective test for determining whether "the
essential bulk of the assets to be transferred qualify as 'goods'
.... P14 If the sale of goods is the dominant part of the agree-
ment, the inclusion in the agreement of provisions for servicing
of the goods or a lease of realty will not preclude application of
Article Two to the entire contract." Treating the agreement as
divisible would be inconsistent with the intentions of the par-
ties and would require the court to rewrite the contract.16 "To
insist that all assets [or aspects of the agreement] qualify as
'goods' would substantially thwart the intentions of the draf-
ters of the Uniform Commercial Code; it would sanction the
absurd."7
Since Article Two was held to be applicable to the distrib-
utorship agreement in Leibel, the court next addressed whether
za See Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 355.1-102(1), (2), 355.2-102, and 355.2-105(1) (1971)
[hereinafter cited as KRS].
"1 1 R.A. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-101:5 (2d
ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as ANDERSON].
12 KRS § 355.2-105(1) (1971).
13 De Filippo v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d 1313, 1323 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 912 (1975).
"Id.
" See Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue, 223 S.E.2d 433, 434-35 (W. Va. 1976); Divi-
sion of Triple T. Serv., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 304 N.Y.S.2d 191 (Sup. Ct. 1969);
Warner Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 365, 367 (E.D. Pa.
1968); but see Foster v. Colorado Radio Corp., 381 F.2d 222, 226 (10th Cir. 1967).
10 Division of Triple T. Serv., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 304 N.Y.S.2d 191, 199-201
(Sup. Ct. 1969).
1 De Filippo v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d 1313, 1323 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 912 (1975).
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the Code required reasonable notice of Raynor's intent to ter-
minate the agreement. The court found that Subsections (2)
and (3) of Kentucky Revised Statutes § 355.2-309 did require
reasonable notice.', Subsection (2) of Section 355.2-309 pro-
vides that "[w]here the contract. . . is indefinite in duration,
it is valid for a reasonable time but unless otherwise agreed
may be terminated at any time by either party." 9 Subsection
(3) of Section 355.2-309 provides that "[t]ermination of a con-
tract by one (1) party except on the happening of an agreed
event requires that reasonable notification be received by the
other party and an agreement dispensing with notification is
invalid if its operation would be unconscionable."20 Applying
Subsection (3), the court concluded that reasonable notifica-
tion of termination was required and that the actual notice
given was insufficient as a matter of law.21
Since Leibel was appealing a summary judgment, the
court attempted to give the lower court some guidance, to
apply on remand, as to what constitutes "reasonable notice."
The appellate court suggested that the dealer should be given
sufficient time to sell his inventory,s that the notice should
give '" 'the other party reasonable time to seek a substitute
arrangement,' " or that the dealer should be given enough
time to recoup his investment. 2 In making these suggestions,
however, the court failed to recognize the differing applica-
bility of Subsections (2) and (3) .25 Subsection (2) provides for
reasonable duration of an agreement that is indefinite as to
duration, whereas Subsection (3) requires reasonable notice
of termination. Most courts have recognized that the period
of time which constitutes a "reasonable duration" may be
significantly different from the amount of advance notice re-
quired prior to termination of an agreement.26
11 No. CA-1800-MR at 5-7 (Ky. App. June 23, 1978).
11 KRS § 355.2-309(2) (1971).
2 KRS § 355.2-309(3) (1971).
2" No. CA-1800-MR at 5 (Ky. App. June 23, 1978).
22 Id.
23 Id. at6.
21 Id. at7.
2 The requirement of Subsection (2) may not have been satisfied in Leibel, since
the agreement lasted a mere two years; however, the appellant only raised the reasona-
ble notice of termination issue which is governed by Subsection (3). Id. at 2.
" See notes 27-43 infra and accompanying text.
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McGinnis Piano and Organ Company v. Yamaha Interna-
tional Corporation, 2 in which the length of a "reasonable dura-
tion" was discussed, was cited in the Leibel opinion for the
proposition that a distributorship agreement terminable at will
"must be allowed to continue for a sufficient period to enable
the franchisee to recoup his investment." The McGinnis court
also held that reasonable notice of termination "is that period
of time necessary to close out the franchise and minimize
losses."29 In McGinnis, the conclusion was reached that a con-
tract duration of six years was insufficient, as a matter of law,
to permit the franchisee to recoup his investment.3 One com-
mentator has noted that 16 months has been held not to consti-
tute a reasonable duration, while other courts have established
a one- or three-year minimum.31 On the other hand, notice
periods of 60 days and three months have been held to be
"reasonable.""
Measuring "reasonable duration" by the amount of time
necessary to allow a dealer to recoup his investment is not an
uncomplicated task. The period will vary "depending on the
significance of the contract relationship to each party and on
the potential harm each may suffer from requiring or not en-
forcing a minimum period. ' 33 In addition, reasonableness
should be determined in the context of the circumstances exist-
ing at the time of termination rather than at the time the
agreement was executed.? The McGinnis court found that six
years' duration was not reasonable by examining "[tihe evi-
dence with respect to the difficulty in building sales in early
years, the losses during those early years, and the investment
21 480 F.2d 474 (8th Cir. 1973).
No. CA-1800-MR at 7 (Ky. App. June 23, 1978).
McGinnis Piano and Organ Co. v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 480 F.2d 474, 479 (8th
Cir. 1973).
'0 Id. at 480.
31 Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights-Franchise
Cancellations, 1967 DUKE L.J. 465, 480 n.54. Although this article addressed termina-
tion rights implied by law, at least one court has stated that the Uniform Commercial
Code has codified such rights in Section 2-309. See McGinnis Piano and Organ Co. v.
Yamaha Int'l Corp., 480 F.2d 474 (8th Cir. 1973).
32 Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights, supra note 31, at 481
n.60.
* Id. at 480.
* Id. at 480-81.
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by McGinnis in time and money in building the franchise
... , When an agreement has been terminated prema-
turely, recoupment has traditionally "been confined to the re-
covery of preliminary expenses incurred in setting up a distrib-
utorship system, such as sums expended for initial promotion
and renting a facility"3 and cannot include recovery of
"damages incurred after termination including lost profits."
' '
Reasonable notice, on the other hand, is measured by the
time necessary to make "substitute arrangements."" The cir-
cumstances of each case will be material factors in determining
what constitutes reasonable notice.39 For example, in the case
of an exclusive dealer-distributorship, the "manufacturer
should receive reasonable notice of termination in order to lo-
cate another distributor in the area. .. ; the distributor should
have reasonable notice in order to make the transition from an
exclusive distributor to a non-exclusive distributor.""0 If the
distributorship is not exclusive, "the notice period may be less
significant.Y4'1 In addition, reasonable notice, or the amount of
advance warning required to terminate an agreement, should
be determined as in the case of reasonable duration, taking into
account the circumstances existing at the time of termination,
rather than at the time the agreement was executed.42
The reasonable notice provision of KRS § 355.2-309(3)
may be circumvented by an agreement expressly providing for
no advance notice of termination. If, however, the court finds
the agreement unconscionable at the time it was executed, the
contract will be rewritten to require advance warning. 3 Never-
480 F.2d at 480.
u Ag-Chem Equip. Co. v. Hahn, Inc., 480 F.2d 482, 487 (8th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 492.
Leibel v. Raynor Mfg. Co., No. CA-1800-MR at 6 (Ky. App. June 23, 1978). The
court also stated that the dealer should be given "sufficient time to sell his remaining
inventory." Id. at 5.
" See Hamilton Tailoring Co. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1310
(S.D. Ohio 1974); KRS § 355.1-204(2) (1971).
,0 Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights, supra note 31, at 481
n.61.
" Id. at 482 n.61.
Id. at 482.
'3 See Division of Triple T. Serv., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 304 N.Y.S.2d 191, 201
(Sup. Ct. 1969); Sinkoff Beverage Co. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 273 N.Y.S.2d 364,
367 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
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theless, an argument based on unconscionability will generally
be unsuccessful in a franchise case since "the doctrine of un-
conscionability is seldom applied in a commercial context.""
2. Sale or Return
A "sale or return" is a transaction in which goods are deliv-
ered to the buyer primarily for resale and may be returned to
the seller if they are not sold, even though the goods conformed
to the contract.45 If the buyer maintains a place of business at
which he deals in goods of the type purchased, the goods held
by the buyer on "sale or return" are subject to the claims of
the buyer's creditors even though title to the goods has been
reserved by the seller. 6 Under the provisions of KRS § 355.2-
326(3), goods belonging to a seller, but in the hands of a buyer
on a "sale or return" basis, will not be subject to the claims of
the buyer's creditors if the seller: (a) complies with a local law
protecting his rights as a consignor by posting a sign on the
buyer's premises,' (b) "establishes that the person to whom
the goods are delivered is generally known to his creditors to
be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others,"48 or (c)
44 Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights, supra note 31, at 490.
" KRS § 355.2-326(l)(b) (1971).
" KRS § 355.2-326(2), (3) (1971).
" As a practical matter, compliance with a sign-posting act under Section 2-
326(3)(a) of the Uniform Commercial Code will not be an alternative available to the
seller. It has been held that this manner of notice to creditors of the buyer may be used
only when it is expressly authorized by an "applicable state law." See, e.g., In re Levy,
3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 291 (E.D. Pa. 1965). Currently, such laws are in force in only two
states, Mississippi and North Carolina. Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-3-7; N.C. CON. & Bus.
CODE § 66-72.
" KRS § 355.2-326(3)(b) (1971). The "general knowledge" exception provided by
Section 2-326(3)(b) may be of little assistance to a seller whose goods, while in the
hands of a buyer, are claimed by the buyer's creditors. The burden of showing
"general" knowledge has been difficult to meet. It has been held, for example, that
the seller-consignor must show that "most of the consignee's creditors knew that a
considerable amount of the consignee's business was selling the goods of others;"
moreover, "most creditors" does not mean "most of the indebtedness represented."
See, e.g., In re Webb, 13 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 394 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (15 creditors, repre-
senting more than one-half of the total claims, had the requisite knowledge, but there
were 84 creditors in all); see also In re International Mobile Homes, 14 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 1150 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
The "general knowledge" alternative in Section 2-326(3)(b) is a remedial device
rather than a planning provision. A merchant-consignor who has the option of either
filing a financing statement under the provisions of UCC Article Nine, Sections 9-408
1978-79]
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has a perfected security interest in the goods pursuant to Arti-
cle Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code.49
The "sale or return" provisions of Article Two were re-
cently reviewed and interpreted by the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals in Founders Investment Corporation v. Fegett.' Unlike
the ordinary "sale or return" case, Fegett addressed the appli-
cability of Section 2-326 to a buyer's return of a chattel to the
seller for resale. Thus, an analysis of this fact situation in terms
of Section 2-326 requires that the original buyer of the chattel
be characterized as the "seller" or "consignor" and the original
seller as the "buyer" or "consignee." The Fegett case involved
the purchase of a mobile home financed by appellee Indiana
National Bank. Six months after the purchase, the buyer
moved the mobile home back to the seller's commercial lot,
claiming that, due to the ill health of his wife, he was unable
to pay for lot rental expenses. Under the terms of an oral agree-
ment between the parties, the seller was authorized to receive
and transmit purchase offers on the mobile home to the buyer,
who had sole discretion to accept or reject them. While the
mobile home was in the possession of the seller-consignee, the
buyer-consignor continued to make payments to the appellee
Bank and the mobile home remained legally registered in his
name. Founders Investment Corporation, which had a recorded
security interest in the seller's after-acquired inventory, subse-
quently attached and removed a number of mobile homes from
the seller's lot, including the mobile home of the buyer, as a
result of a commercial dispute with the seller. Although the
attachment was later declared void, the buyer's mobile home
was sold and was never returned to him. The appellee Bank
perfected its security interest in the buyer's mobile home after
the attachment had been declared void. 51
and 9-114, or relying on Section 2-326(3)(b), should always choose the former. Such a
filing is not burdensome; moreover, even if "general knowledge" is assured, a change
in the identity of the buyer's creditors may again jeopardize the interests of the consig-
nor if a filing has not been made. Coogan, Leases of Equipment and Some Other
Unconventional Security Devices: An Analysis of UCC Section 1-201(37) and Article
9, 1973 DUKE L.J. 909, 952-54 (1973).
" KRS § 355.2-326(3)(c) (1971).
5 No. 76-52 (Ky. App. Apr. 14, 1978), discretionary review granted, 25 Ky. Law
Summ. 13 at 16 (Ky. 1978).
" Id. at 1, 2.
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The appellant, Founders Investment Corporation, con-
tended that when the buyer placed the mobile home in the
seller's possession, he had delivered the chattel to the mobile
home dealer on a "sale or return" basis, even though he did not
intend to convey any ownership interest to the seller.52 Thus,
it was argued, the buyer occupied the position of a "seller"
whose goods might be claimed by the creditors (including
Founders Investment) of his "buyer," the dealer, if one of the
three exceptions to this rule did not apply. Rejecting the appel-
lant's argument, the court held that the transaction between
the purchaser and the mobile home dealer was not a "sale or
return."53 Consequently, Founders acquired no interest in the
buyer's mobile home under the after-acquired property clause
of its security agreement with the mobile home dealer.u
Allgeier v. Campisi 5 was cited as controlling precedent in the
Fegett case, while the appellant's authorities dealing with
transactions between commercial dealers were dismissed as
inapposite .5 In Allgeier, an automobile was delivered to a
dealer by the individual owner with an understanding that the
dealer would secure offers of purchase and sell the automobile
upon approval of the owner. The Allgeier court held that the
parties had not engaged in a "sale or return" transaction. 7
The Fegett court justified its decision on the grounds that
"it would be an unjust and unwise policy to impose"58 the sale
or return provisions of KRS § 355.2-326 "upon an individual
owner, as distinguished from a commercial one."59 The Fegett
and Allgeier decisions were thus regarded by the court as state-
ments of a judicially-created exception to the sale or return
provisions of the Code, in that they protect an otherwise unpro-
tected group:"0 "the private individual vis-a-vis the commercial
52 Id. at 3.
Id. at 3 , 4.
U Id. at 4.
159 S.E.2d 458 (Ga. App. 1968).
" Founders Inv. Corp. v. Fegett, No. 76-52 at 4 (Ky. App. Apr. 14, 1978), discre-
tionary review granted, 25 Ky Law Summ. 13 at 16 (Ky. 1978).
" 159 S.E.2d at 459.
No. 76-52 at 4.
, Id. (emphasis in original).
" This group does not fall within any of the exceptions listed in KRS § 355.2-
326(3) (1971).
1978-79]
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financier when such owner merely attempts. . . to utilize the
marketing or sales services of a commercial dealer with no in-
tention of transferring any ownership interest to such dealer."61
Commercial dealers and financiers would not be unduly
harmed, according to the court, since transactions such as that
in Fegett are "relatively few" in number.12 By contrast, individ-
ual owners would suffer considerable loss if the Code's sale or
return provisions were applied to them."
A different method of analysis was used in a New York
case, Cosgriff v. Liberty National Bank & Trust Co.64 Although
the facts in Cosgriff were similar to those in the Allgeier case,
the Cosgriff court focused on the security agreement of the
seller-consignee's creditor to determine whether it covered the
automobile delivered to the seller by the buyer for the purpose
of finding a purchaser. The court held that a security interest
in "inventory, now owned or hereafter acquired" gave the se-
cured creditor an interest in only those automobiles actually
owned by its debtor, and thus "did not cover any cars owned
by third persons . . ., which were merely in the temporary
possession of the dealer, as an agent, for sales purposes in
which the dealer's only interest was in a commission in the
event that a sale was consummated." 5
The result in Fegett, favoring the individual "buyer-
consignor," is consistent with the Official Comments to the
Uniform Commercial Code. The comments state that Section
2-326 "presupposes that a contract for sale is contemplated by
the parties . .... "66 In the Fegett, Allgeier, and Cosgriff cases,
the "buyer-consignor" did not deliver the chattel to the "seller-
consignee" with an intent to sell to the dealer. Consequently,
the creditor of the seller-consignee had no claim to the goods
of the buyer-consignor under the "sale or return" provisions of
Section 2-326. The exception to Section 2-326 created by the
court in Fegett, and the Cosgriff analysis of the security agree-
" No. 76-52 at 4.
,2 Id.
3Id.
' 296 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
"Id. at 519.
" U.C.C. § 2-326, Comment 1 (1962 version); see also 1 ANDERSON, supra note 11,
at § 2-326:1(1).
[Vol. 67
KENTUCKY LAW SuRvEY
ment between the seller-consignee and his creditor, are there-
fore unnecessary to reach the conclusion that the sale or return
provisions are inapplicable when the private individual merely
relinquishes possession of goods to utilize the marketing or
sales services of a commercial dealer with no intention of enter-
ing into a contract for sale with the dealer-consignee.
3. Voidable Title and the Good Faith Purchaser for Value
Under certain circumstances, a party may obtain good
title to goods even though his transferor did not have legal title.
United Road Machinery Co. v. Jasper6 7 demonstrates the power
of a good faith purchaser for value to defeat the claims of the
original owner under the voidable title provisions of the Uni-
form Commercial Code. 8 United Road and Consolidated Coal
entered into a lease-purchase agreement for truck scales, which
provided for a 24-month payment period with an option to
purchase. The truck scales were delivered to Consolidated
Coal, but United Road never received any payments on the
lease. About two months after the delivery, Consolidated Coal
sold the truck scales for $8,500. Before purchasing the scales,
the buyer examined the pertinent county records for possible
notations of encumbrances on the scales but none were found.
Two days later, the purchaser sold the scales for $8,500, after
the purchaser's transferee had again searched the county rec-
ords for encumbrances without result. United Road brought an
action against the two purchasers, both of whom denied any
knowledge of the dispute between United Road and Consoli-
dated Coal."
The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment for
the purchasers and noted that there were three means by which
the purchasers-appellees could have received good title to the
truck scales." The appellees could have acquired good title if
the seller, Consolidated Coal, possessed good title to the
scales.7' This, of course, was not the case, since Consolidated
n No. CA-1868-MR (Ky. App. June 23, 1978).
" KRS § 355.2-403(1) (1971).
"No. CA-1868-MR at 1-3.
78 Id. at3.
" Id.; see KRS § 355.2-403(1) (1971).
1978-791
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Coal failed to tender any consideration for the scales to United
Road. If, however, Consolidated Coal had voidable title to the
scales, then the appellees would acquire good title by purchase
if they were "good faith purchasers for value. 72 A transfer by
an original owner (e.g., United Road) to a vendor (e.g., Consoli-
dated Coal) will confer voidable title upon the vendor, even
though the vendor does not receive "good title" as against the
original owner:73 (1) when the vendor has deceived the original
owner as to his identity;74 (2) when the vendor acquired posses-
sion from "the original owner under circumstances constituting
larcenous fraud;"' '75 (3) when the vendor paid the original owner
with a bad check;7" or (4) when the vendor bought the goods
"from the original owner under a 'cash sale' but in fact did not
pay for the goods."" The court assumed that one of the above
four situations applied to the transaction between United Road
and Consolidated Coal. United Road had argued that the
transaction was a lease rather than a purchase and that Consol-
idated Coal could not have transferred good title, since a trans-
action of purchase is necessary to trigger application of the
voidable title doctrine. The court held, however, that the domi-
nant intention of the parties was to consummate a sale, and
that the transaction was thus a purchase for purposes of apply-
ing the voidable title doctrine.78 Moreover, the court concluded
that each appellee qualified as a "good faith purchaser for
value," defined by the court 'as one who takes by purchase
getting sufficient consideration to support a simple contract,
and who is honest in the transaction of the purchase.' 79 There-
fore, the appellees could obtain good title from a transferor
with voidable title.
Finally, the court stated that the doctrine of estoppel
would protect the appellees even if Consolidated Coal pos-
" No. CA-1868-MR at 3.
" Id. at4.
11 KRS § 355.2-403(1)(a) (1971).
71 2 ANDERSON, supra note 11, at § 2-403:8, see also KRS § 355.2-403(1)(b) (1971).
76 KRS § 355.2-403(1)(b) (1971).
7 2 ANDERSON, supra note 11, at § 2-403:8; see also KRS § 355.2-403(1)(d) (1971).
,United Road Mach. Co. v. Jasper, No. CA-1868-MR at 4 (Ky. App. June 23,
1978). At the end of the 24-month lease agreement, Consolidated Coal would have paid
$14, 92 for a truck scales worth $13,133. Id. at 2.
11 Id. at 3-4, quoting the circuit court.
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sessed neither good title nor voidable title. Although, as a gen-
eral rule, "'one who had no title could convey none,"'80 an
exception was created in equity when "the seller possessed in-
dicia of ownership sufficient to indicate to the purchaser that
he had power to convey."" United Road was estopped from
asserting its title against the appellees since United Road ena-
bled Consolidated Coal to represent itself to the appellees as
the owner of the truck scales, no encumbrances were revealed
by the appellees' search of county records, and the appellees
were unaware of the dispute between United Road and Consoli-
dated Coal. Consequently, the appellees were deemed bona
fide purchasers in good faith and United Road was required to
bear the loss since its "'initial conduct'" put Consolidated
Coal in the position to cause the loss. 2
B. Bulk Transfers
Article Six of the Uniform Commercial Code, governing
bulk transfers, applies only to enterprises "whose principal
business is the sale of merchandise from stock, including those
who manufacture what they sell." A transfer of "a major
part" of the materials, supplies, merchandise or other inven-
tory of the transferor's business must comply with the provi-
sions of Article Six if the transfer is not made in the ordinary
course of business.84 In addition, a "transfer of a substantial
part of the equipment .. .of such an enterprise is a bulk
transfer if it is made in connection with a bulk transfer of
inventory, but not otherwise." '
If the transfer falls within the scope of Article Six, four
basic requirements must be satisfied: (1) The transferee must
,Id. at 5, quoting 67 AM. JUR. 2D Sales § 259 (1973).
" No. CA-1868-MR at 5 (Ky. App. June 23, 1978).
,z Id., quoting Dudley v. Lovins, 220 S.W.2d 978, 980 (Ky. 1949).
KRS § 355.6-102(3) (1971). "[F]arming. . . contracting ... professional serv-
ices,. . such ... as cleaning shops, barber shops, pool halls, hotels, restaurants, and
the like whose principal business is the sale not of merchandise but of services" are
not governed by Article Six. 3 ANDERSON, supra note 11, at § 6-102:1(3).
91 KRS § 355.6-102(1) (1971).
s5 KRS § 355.6-102(2) (1971). 'Transfers of investment securities are not covered
by the Article, nor are transfers of money, accounts receivable, chattel paper, contract
rights, negotiable instruments, nor things in action generally." 3 ANDERSON, supra note
11, at § 6-102:1(3).
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require "the transferor to furnish a list of his existing credi-
tors." (2) Both the transferor and transferee must "prepare a
schedule of the property to be transferred sufficient to identify
it.''87 (3) The transferee must preserve the list of creditors and
the property schedule for six months following the transfer and
permit any creditor of the transferor to inspect or copy the list
and schedule at all reasonable hours or file the same in the
county clerk's office. 8 (4) The transferee must give a specified
form of notice to the transferor's listed creditors and to all other
persons known to the transferee to have claims against the
transferor.89 The purpose of these requirements is to protect the
rights of those creditors of the transferor who may have an
interest in the transferor's assets at the time of transfer.
1. Scope and the Statute of Limitations
Fifth Third Bank v. Kentucky Club, Inc.9" dealt primarily
with determining when the bulk transfer limitations period
may be tolled. Nevertheless, the preliminary issue of whether
Article Six was applicable is also noteworthy, since Fifth Third
Bank involved the transfer of a bar and restaurant business, a
transfer specifically excluded from Article Six by its Official
Comments.2 Despite the unequivocal language of the Com-
ments, "there is a split of authority over whether restaurants
and bars are included. '9 3 The Kentucky Court of Appeals did
not consider this issue, however. The court merely noted that
Section 355.6-102(4) governs all bulk transfers except those
exempted by Section 355.6-103.11 Since none of those excep-
tions applied, the court held that the Kentucky Club transfer
was governed by Article Six. 5 As a result of the court's failure
" KRS § 355.6-104(1)(a) (Supp. 1978).
'T KRS § 355.6-104(1)(b) (Supp. 1978).
KRS § 355.6-104(1)(c) (Supp. 1978).
See KRS §§ 355.6-105, 355.6-107 (1971).
Cornelius v. J & R Motor Supply Corp., 468 S.W.2d 781, 782 (Ky. 1971).
" No. CA-2234-MR (Ky. App. July 21, 1978), discretionary review granted 26 Ky.
Law Summ. 2 at 29 (Ky. 1979).
12 U.C.C. § 6-102, Comment 2 (1962 version); see also 3 ANDERSON, supra note 11,
at § 6-102:1.
13 J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE § 19-2 (1972).
"1 No. CA-2234-MR at 2.
Is Id.
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to consider the Official Comments to the Code, the
"restaurant-bar" issue may still be legitimately contested in
Kentucky. Practitioners may also question whether other en-
terprises engaged primarily in the sale of services rather than
merchandise are now governed by Article Six in light of the
decision in Fifth Third Bank.96
The statute of limitations issue arose in Fifth Third Bank
because the appellant's amended complaint, alleging non-
compliance with the bulk transfer notice provisions, was filed
more than one year after the transfer of Kentucky Club's real
and personal property. 7 Section 355.6-111 requires all bulk
transfer suits to be brought not "more than six months after
the date on which the transferee took possession of the goods
unless the transfer has been concealed." Concealment of the
transfer tolls the six-month limitations period until the trans-
feror's creditors discover the transfer.
9 8
The court held that the transfer in Fifth Third Bank had
been concealed, thereby tolling the six-month statute of limita-
tions. The parties to the bulk transfer had provided by written
agreement that Article Six would not apply to the Kentucky
Club transfer. Although Section 355.1-102(3) allows the parties
to vary the Code by agreement in some situations, the court
held that Section 355.6-102(4) precluded enforcement of this
contract provision.9 The parties cannot "seek to waive the ap-
plication of the Bulk Sales Law on the one hand and then
attempt to employ the statute of limitations as a protection
against the law's application.""'
Authorities interpreting Section 6-111 have concluded that
there must be an affirmative concealment of the bulk transfer
before the limitations period will be tolled.' Under this theory,
"mere nondisclosure or failure to give public notice" does not
constitute affirmative concealment.02 Although the parties did
not give the notice required by Article Six, the Kentucky Club
" See 3 ANDE SON, supra note 11, at § 6-102:1.
"No. CA-2234-MR at 3.
" KRS § 355.6-111 (1971).
"Fifth Third Bank v. Kentucky Club, Inc., No. CA-2234-MR at 3.
"' Id.
"' See Aluminum Shapes, Inc. v. K-A Liquidating Co., 290 F. Supp. 356, 358
(W.D. Pa. 1968); 3 ANDERSON, supra note 11, at § 6-111:5.
"0 No. CA-2234-MR at 4.
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transfer was recorded in the county clerk's office.'"3 Nonethe-
less, the court held "that the attempt by the parties to avoid
the notice provision of the law was tantamount to a conceal-
ment of a transfer of assets within the meaning of" Section
355.6-111. o4 By intentionally avoiding Article Six, "the parties
took such affirmative action as to amount to an active conceal-
ment of the transfer."'0 5 Consequently, the transfer of Ken-
tucky Club was ineffective against the creditor, Fifth Third
Bank, the party Article Six was designed to protect.' 6
2. Bulk Transfer Exemption
A bulk transfer normally within the scope of Article Six
may be exempted from its requirements by Section 355.6-103.
One of these statutory exemptions was the subject of contro-
versy in Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Maxwell.'0 7 In this case, a
businessman, Mr. King, obtained a loan to purchase and oper-
ate a grocery store by signing a promissory note and security
agreement. The security agreement gave the secured party,
Malone & Hyde, a security interest in the store's fixtures, ap-
pliances, present and after-acquired inventory, and proceeds.
A "future advance" clause, providing that the value of the
security interest would fluctuate to the extent of any subse-
quent advances made by the creditor, was also incorporated in
the security agreement. Subsequent to the perfection of Ma-
lone & Hyde's security interest, Maxwell, the appellee, sup-
plied merchandise to King's grocery store. Shortly thereafter,
the note was declared in default and Mr. King agreed to assign
the inventory, fixtures, cash, and bank accounts of the store to
Malone & Hyde in exchange for forgiveness of the balance of
the note and an open account in the amount of approximately
$182,000. Maxwell brought this action against Malone & Hyde
and King for nonpayment for the merchandise furnished and
for failure to comply with the provisions of Article Six.
The parties agreed that the transfer to Malone & Hyde of
the inventory, fixtures, cash, and bank account was a bulk
103 Id.
I'" Id. at 3.
10 Id. at 4.
106 Id.
1- 557 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. App. 1977).
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transfer. 8 However, such a transfer may be exempt from Arti-
cle Six if it qualifies as a transfer "in settlement or realization
of a lien or other security interest."'' 9 The unsecured "creditors
of the transferor cannot be jeopardized""110 by this type of trans-
fer of inventory covered by a security agreement since the se-
cured party has a superior interest in the goods. Consequently,
Article Six notice to unsecured creditors would serve no useful
purpose."' Had Malone & Hyde fully released King from his
obligation to repay the amount he owed, there would have been
no question that the transfer of inventory and other assets was
in settlement of the security interest and therefore exempt from
Article Six."2 Although King was released from his obligation
on the note, Malone & Hyde created a new obligation when an
open account was established for King's benefit. Creation of
the open account could not be considered a bulk transfer;"'
however, the open account triggered consideration of the
Starman rule"' that the security interest exemption is inap-
plicable when part of the transfer is made to satisfy unsecured
obligations."' Unsecured creditors who have not received no-
tice are prejudiced in this situation because the transferee did
not have a superior interest in all of the goods transferred. ' 6
The Starman rule would apply in Malone & Hyde if the open
account had not been covered by the future advance clause of
the security agreement. But for the future advance clause,
King would have been released from the obligation on the note
and would have received a new line of unsecured credit; thus
Maxwell would have had a valid claim against the inventory
transferred. The only issue in Malone & Hyde, therefore, was
'' Id. at 909.
" KRS § 355.6-103(3) (1971).
" Starman v. John Wolfe, Inc., 490 S.W.2d 377, 382 (Mo. App. 1973).
' The Section 355.6-103(3) exemption deals with "instances where the general
creditors cannot be harmed because of a specific senior security interest covering the
transferred items." Id.
I1" See American Metal Finishers, Inc. v. Palleschi, 391 N.Y.S.2d 170 (Sup. Ct.
1977); Midland Bean Co. v. Farmers State Bank, 552 P.2d 317 (Colo. App. 1976).
"I Transfers of money are not covered by Article Six. See 3 ANDERSON, supra note
11, at § 6-102:1(3).
"I See Starman v. John Wolfe, Inc., 490 S.W.2d 377, 382-83 (Mo. App. 1973).
115 Id.
SId.
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whether a security agreement with a future advance clause
secures an open account subsequently established between the
parties. The court held that the open account was secured and
therefore found that the transfer was within the security inter-
est exception to Article Six." 7
3. Application of the Holder in Due Course Doctrine
to Bulk Transactions
In the recent case of Henkin, Inc. v. Berea Bank & Trust
Co.,"1 8 the Kentucky Court of Appeals considered the applica-
tion of the Article Three holder in due course doctrine to an
Article Six bulk transaction. Henkin, Inc. purchased a radio
station from Tinker, Inc., executing a promissory note as part
of the purchase price. Henkin applied to the Berea Bank &
Trust Company for a loan to take advantage of Tinker's offer
to discount the note for full payment. Henkin advised the bank
officers of the specific purpose of the loan, but the application
was rejected. While pursuing financing from other sources,
Henkin was informed by the majority stockholder of the Berea
Bank that the Bank would "work something out"'' on the
proposed loan. Subsequently, the majority stockholder dis-
cussed with Tinker the possibility of purchasing the Henkin
note at a discount without disclosing the fact that Henkin had
applied for a loan to pay the note in full. The Bank's board of
directors later authorized the purchase of the Henkin note from
Tinker. As a result of the purchase, the Bank acquired the
mortgage on Henkin's radio station which secured the promis-
sory note. Foreclosure proceedings were thereafter instituted by
the Bank when Henkin's first installment payment was not
made on time. 2'
Prior to adjudication of the foreclosure proceeding, the
State Commissioner of Banking closed the Berea Bank, and the
Henkin note and other bank assets were transferred to the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation. An intervening complaint
was filed in the foreclosure action by the F.D.I.C., seeking the
" 557 S.W.2d at 909.
566 S.W.2d 420 (Ky. App. 1978).
' Id. at 422.
120 Id.
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sale of Henkin's property for the full amount of the note. A
counterclaim for $535,000 was filed by Henkin against the
Bank, alleging fraud and breach of a fiduciary relationship.
This counterclaim was also asserted as a set-off on the amount
due the F.D.I.C. 2 1 The F.D.I.C. invoked the holder-in-due-
course doctrine, contending that Henkin's claim against the
Bank could not be used as a defense to the collection of the
note.
The court relied on Section 355.3-302(3) (c) to hold that the
F.D.I.C. was not a holder in due course and was therefore sub-
ject to the defenses Henkin asserted against the Bank. 22 That
Section provides that "[a] holder does not become a holder in
due course of an instrument by purchasing it as part of a bulk
transaction not in the regular course of business of the trans-
feror." In such a situation, the holder "is merely a successor in
interest to the prior holder and can acquire no better rights."'1'
The court noted that Section 355.3-302(3)(c) "has particular
application to the purchase by one bank of a substantial part
of the paper held by another bank which is threatened with
insolvency and seeking to liquidate its assets."'' 2 Furthermore,
a bulk transaction "does not possess the characteristics of a
sale for value, in good faith and without notice of defense."'
25
The issue of whether a confidential or fiduciary relation-
ship exists between a bank and its customer was a question of
first impression in Kentucky. 26 The trial court dismissed Hen-
kin's counterclaim, stating that a bank is not "legally bound
by morals, ethics or strictures of conscience except as may be
imposed by legislation and that there is no 'confidential rela-
tionship' between a banker and its [sic] customers. 127 This
decision was reversed by the court of appeals.12 The court
noted that Henkin had confidentially advised the Bank of its
opportunity to discount the note solely to further consideration
121 Id.
122 Id. at 424.
"2 2 ANDERSON, supra note 11, at § 3-302:1(3).
121 566 S.W.2d at 424; see also 2 ANDERSON, supra note 11, at § 3-302:1(3).
lu 566 S.W.2d at 424; see also 2 ANDERSON, supra note 11, at § 3-302:23.
I 566 S.W.2d at 423.
127 Id.
In Id. at 425.
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of its loan application.2 ' Relying on a Massachusetts case' 30
and on general equitable principles, the court held that Henkin
had a valid cause of action against the Berea Bank for breach
of a fiduciary duty. 3 ' Absent a finding of such a duty, a bank
official could use the information furnished by a loan applicant
to "purchase the property behind the back of the applicant,' 3
thereby impairing or destroying the public's confidence in
banking institutions. "'A bank official to whom an application
for a loan is made must act fairly and impartially toward the
bank and toward the applicant. He is prohibited from deriving
any personal gain at the expense[s] of the applicant."'"' '
The issue whether a bank has a fiduciary duty to its cus-
tomers with regard to confidential matters has not been widely
addressdd. 34 Notwithstanding the lack of precedent on this
issue, and the trial court's exhortations that only the legisla-
ture could require banks to follow "morals, ethics or strictures
of conscience,' 35 the court's decision to impose fiduciary re-
sponsibilities on a bank is consistent with longstanding legal
and equitable principles. A bank, like a trustee, physician,
attorney or corporate director, will at times occupy a position
of trust and will be privy to information of a confidential na-
ture. There is no justification in law or equity for a rule which
would permit the bank to use such information to obtain an
advantage at the expense of its customer. The Henkin decision
thus provides a bank customer with necessary and appropriate
protection.
C. Secured Transactions
Whether Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code
ra d.
" Warsofsky v. Sherman, 93 N.E.2d 612 (Mass. 1950).
," 566 S.W.2d at 424.
'2 Id. at 423-24, quoting Warsofsky v. Sherman, 93 N.E.2d 612, 615-16 (Mass.
1950).
"' 566 S.W.2d at 424, quoting Warsofsky v. Sherman, 93 N.E.2d 612, 615-16
(Mass. 1950).
"1 566 S.W.2d at 423. An Illinois court has, however, concluded that the mere
existence of a debtor-creditor relationship does not impose a fiduciary duty on the
creditor bank. Funderburg v. Shappert, 165 N.E.2d 543 (11. App. 1960) (abstract
opinion).
"1 566 S.W.2d at 423.
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governs the priorities to be accorded to parties with conflicting
interests in aircraft has been the subject of considerable contro-
versy.'36 Section 9-104 of the Code states that Article Nine does
not apply "to a security interest subject to any statute of the
United States . . .to the extent that such statute governs the
rights of parties to and third parties affected by transactions
in particular types of property .... 137 The Federal Aviation
Act'3 s contains provisions which clearly govern the perfection of
security interests in aircraft 3 and thus, at least with respect
to such perfection, there is no dispute that Article Nine is
inapplicable. 4 ' It is less widely accepted, however, that the
remaining provisions of Article Nine, and in particular the
rules governing the relative priorities of secured parties and
purchasers of the collateral, may be applied to resolve compet-
ing claims to aircraft collateral.
In the recent case of Cessna Finance Corporation v. Sky-
ways Enterprises, Inc.,"I the Kentucky Court of Appeals
adopted the favored position on this issue,' holding that Con-
gress, in the Federal Aviation Act, preempted the field only
with respect to perfection of security interests and that a prior-
ity conflict between a secured party and a subsequent pur-
chaser of the aircraft collateral from the debtor was properly
resolved with reference to state law:
In Compare Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 91 Cal. Rptr. 1,476 P.2d 401 (Sup.
Ct. Cal. 1970), with State Securities Co. v. Aviation Enterprises, Inc., 355 F.2d 225
(10th Cir. 1966), and Feldman v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 408 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Pa.
1976).
I' U.C.C. § 9-104(a) (1962 version).
In 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1976).
In Under the Act, the Secretary of Transportation is required to establish and
maintain a system for the recording of all interests in aircraft, including interests taken
for the purposes of security. 49 U.S.C. § 1403(a)(3) (1976). Failure to file such an
interest for recordation in the office of the Secretary of Transporation renders it invalid
against all persons except the debtor. 49 U.S.C. § 1403(c) (1976).
10 See generally, J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 942 (1972); cf. I G. GamsoRE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PER-
SONAL PROPERTY § 13.6 at 427 n.20 (1965).
"I No. CA-1488-MR (Ky. App. Apr. 21, 1978), affl'd, 26 Ky. Law Summ. 4 at 20
(Ky. 1979).
2 J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORm COMMER-
CIAL CODE 942 (1972); see also R. BRAUCHEa AND R. RIEGERT, INTRODUCTION TO COMMER-
CIAL TRANSACTIONS 447 (1977).
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While Congress may choose to regulate an aspect of interstate
commerce, unless the clear intent of the legislation is to oc-
cupy the field entirely, the states have the power to continue
to regulate in that area consistent with the federal law.
Congress did not intend, however, to displace and
preempt all state law involving priorities of liens and title
interests in aircraft.'43
Cessna Finance Corporation (CFC) had financed the sale
of an airplane by Aviation Activities, Inc. to Central States
Aircraft, Inc. The evidence adduced at trial established that
Cessna knew that the buyer, a dealer, contemplated immediate
resale of the aircraft and that, although the terms of the secu-
rity agrebment prohibited resale without CFC's consent, CFC
had impliedly consented to such resale on other occasions."'
CFC retained a security interest in the airplane and filed its
notice of that interest in the manner and at the place required
by the Federal Aviation Act.'45 The dealer transferred title to a
sister corporation, which immediately sold the plane to Sky-
ways. Subsequently, First National Security Bank was granted
a security interest in the plane, and that security interest was
also duly perfected.
In deciding that Skyways' purchase of the airplane extin-
guished CFC's security interest, and that First National Secu-
rity Bank's security interest was therefore prior to that of CFC,
the court applied Section 9-306(2) of the Code,'46 which pro-
vides that a security interest normally continues in collateral
notwithstanding its sale or other disposition to a third party
13 Cessna Finance Corp. v. Skyways Enterprises, Inc., No. CA-1488-MR at 4 (Ky.
App. Apr. 21, 1978), affl'd, 26 Ky. Law Summ. 4, at 20 (Ky. 1979), quoting Feldman
v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 408 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (emphasis added) (cita-
tions omitted).
"I No. CA-1488-MR at 2 (Ky. App. Apr. 21, 1978), affl'd, 26 Ky. Law Summ. 4 at
20 (Ky. 1979).
"I Id. The files of the Federal Aviation Agency are maintained in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma. Id., cf., I G. GILMORE, SECURrrY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 13.6 at
427 (1965).
4I No. CA-1488-MR at 5 (Ky. App. Apr. 21, 1978), affl'd, 26 Ky. Law Summ. 4 at
20 (Ky. 1979). Section 9-306(2) states that "[e]xcept where this Article otherwise
provides, a security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or
other disposition thereof by the debtor unless his action was authorized by the secured
party in the security agreement or otherwise. . . ... U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1962 version).
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unless otherwise provided by applicable Code sections and un-
less such disposition was authorized. The court found that
CFC's prior course of dealing, in which it had impliedly con-
sented to resale of collateral by the debtor, sufficed to establish
authorized disposition in Cessna. Moreover, Skyways was held
to be a "buyer in ordinary course of business" within the mean-
ing of Section 9-307(1) and thus, under the terms of that sec-
tion, took the aircraft free of CFC's security interest.4 '
A "buyer in ordinary course of business" must purchase
"in good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is
in violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a
third party ... ."I" Although it was clear that Skyways
lacked knowledge of CFC's security interest, CFC contended
that Skyways did not purchase with the requisite good faith.
"Good faith" is defined generally as "honesty in fact in the
conduct or transaction concerned; '"'4 however, a different stan-
dard is applicable to merchants 5 1 in cases involving sales of
goods.' 51 In this latter context, "good faith" means "honesty in
fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing in the trade." 5' CFC argued that Skyways failed
to observe reasonable commercial standards when it neglected
to search the records of properly filed security interests prior
11 Under Section 9-307(1), "[a] buyer in ordinary course of business . . .takes
free of a security interest created by his seller even though the security interest is
perfected and even though the buyer knows of its existence." U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1962
version). Skyways had purchased the aircraft from DuPage Aircraft, a corporation
formed by one Robert Brooks, who had also formed Central States Aircraft, Inc., the
original debtor of CFC. No. CA-1488-MR at 1-2 (Ky. App. Apr. 21, 1978). Although
the court did not discuss the requirement of Section 9-307(1), that the security interest
to be extinguished be created by the buyer's seller, it would appear that the court
regarded the two corporations as a common entity for purposes of applying that sec-
tion.
LU U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1962 version).
.' U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1962 version).
" A "merchant" is defined under the Code as
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds
himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods
involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be
attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary
who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (1962 version).
M' See text accompanying notes 155-160 infra.
M U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (1962 version).
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to its purchase of the aircraft.'53 This argument was rejected by
the court, which stated that negligence on the part of Skyways
in failing to conduct a title search would not constitute
"dishonesty" or "unfair dealings."' 54 Thus, CFC was deemed to
be divested of its security interest in the aircraft collateral.
Although the result reached in Cessna appears proper, the
court's application of a good faith test based on "observance of
reasonable commercial standards" and its interpretation of the
meaning of that phrase are arguably unsound. It has been held
that, for purposes of applying Article Nine of the Code, mer-
chants need only meet the general test of good faith, "honesty
in fact," and not the further burden of observing "reasonable
commercial standards."'55 The latter definition appears to be
limited in its application to cases arising under Article Two,
dealing with sales of goods. Such a construction of the Code is
supported by the scheme of Article Nine, 5' by language in
Article Two,' 5 and by the Official Comments to the Code.' 5
'5 No. CA-1488-MR at 6 (Ky. App. Apr. 21, 1978) aff'd, 26 Ky. Law Summ. 4 at
20 (Ky. 1979).
" Id.
"1 Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp., 290 A.2d 648 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1972); Asso-
ciates Discount Corp. v. Rattan Chevrolet, Inc., 462 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1970); but see
Bank of Utica v. Castle Ford, Inc., 317 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1971).
'1- Article Nine contains an index of definitions applicable to that article, and
includes a reference to the general definitions in Article One of the Code. U.C.C. § 9-
105(4) (1962 version). The Sherrock court noted that no analogous reference is made
to definitions contained in Article Two, in which the good faith standard applicable
to merchants is set forth. Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp., 290 A.2d 648, 651
(Sup. Ct. Del. 1972). Similarly, the court noted that the definitional cross references
appended to Section 9-307(1) refer to several of the definitions in Article One, but
make no reference to those in Article Two. Id.
I" The definition of good faith applied to merchants is preceded by the words
"[iln this Article." U.C.C. § 2-103 (1962 version). By negative implication, the defini-
tion is intended to have no effect on the interpretation and construction of provisions
in other Articles of the Code. Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp., 290 A.2d 648, 651
(Sup. Ct. Del. 1972).
"' In the 1962 Official Text of the American Law Institute, National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the drafters of the
Uniform Commercial Code comment on "good faith" in Note 19 under Sec-
tion 1-201 as follows:
'Good Faith', whenever it is used in the Code, means at least
what is here stated. [i.e., honesty in fact] In certain Articles, by
specific provision, additional requirements are made applicable.
See e.g., Secs. 2-103(1)(b), 7-404. To illustrate, in the article on
Sales, Section 2-103, good faith is expressly defined as including
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If "honesty in fact," is the standard of good faith pertinent
to Skyways' purchase, the court's conclusion in Cessna is a
correct one. "Honesty in fact" refers to a subjective test of good
faith, under which negligence or commercial unreasonableness
are irrelevant; good faith in this context may be found when
the actor has a "pure heart," albeit also an "empty head."'' 9
Conversely, if observance of reasonable commercial standards
is necessary to a finding that Skyways acted in good faith in
Cessna, and if, as is likely, the commercially reasonable mer-
chant would definitely conduct a search of recorded security
interests prior to the purchase of an aircraft, then Skyways
could not be found to have acted in good faith. "Dishonesty"
and "unfairness" would be inferred in this instance from the
failure to act in accordance with reasonable commercial stan-
dards. "0
in the case of a merchant observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade, so that throughout that
article wherever a merchant appears in the case an inquiry into his
observance of such standards is necessary [sici to determine his
good faith.'
It would thus appear that the draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial Code
meant the definition of "good faith" set forth in Article 2-103(1)(b) be lim-
ited to the specific Article in which it appears: Sales Article 2 only.
290 A.2d at 651 n.2.
"I Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM.
L. Rav. 798, 812 (1958). Under this definition, a party is found to have acted in good
faith "only if he acted with innocent ignorance or lack of suspicion." Farnsworth, Good
Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 30 U. CHn. L. REv. 666, 668 (1963).
10 It would appear that the courts have little difficulty in finding that, if the
objective standard of "good faith" is applied, a failure to act in a commercially
reasonable manner is tantamount to a lack of good faith. See, e.g., Sherrock v. Com-
mercial Credit Corp., 277 A.2d 708 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1971), rev'd, 290 A.2d 648 (Sup. Ct.
Del. 1972). "Only to the extent that the test is objective do commercial practices
become vital in establishing the standards of good faith." Farnsworth, Good Faith
Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
30 U. CHI. L. REv. 666, 677 (1963).
The Code apparently does not impose an obligation on Skyways to conduct the
title search which CFC would require. Even if Skyways had knowledge of CFC's secu-
rity interest, Skyways would qualify as a "buyer in ordinary course of business" under
Section 9-307(1), so long as Skyways had no knowledge that the sale of the aircraft
was "in violation of" that security interest-i.e., that the disposition was not author-
ized. See generally J. WHrrE AND R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 940-42 (1972).
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HIL. CONSUMER LAW
A. Parking Garages and Bailments
In Kentucky, aparking garage operator who requires auto-
mobile owners to relinquish their car keys when they leave their
automobiles on his premises is, by statute, a bailee for hire. 6'
In a recent Kentucky case, Central Parking System v. Miller,6 2
the court of appeals considered the status of a parking garage
operator who did not require the automobile owner to relin-
quish his car keys. Each customer of Central Parking System
(CPS) took a ticket from an automatic ticket machine upon
entering CPS's garage and a inechanical gate blocking the
entry to the garage would rise. The customer then parked his
car and removed his keys. The ticket, indicating the time when
the customer entered the garage, was presented by the cus-
tomer to the gate attendant at the exit, who would use it to
determine the parking charges.6 3 The appellee, Stephen
Miller, parked his car at the CPS garage on several occasions
over an eight-month period and, during the course of that pe-
riod, seven wire wheels were stolen from his car while it was
parked at the garage. Mr. Miller brought an action against
CPS, wherein the only issue on appeal was whether a bailment
relationship existed between the parties.6 4
The relationship between automobile owners and parking
garage operators is usually one of bailment, lease or license,
depending upon the circumstances of the case. 6' "Generally, a
bailment is created where the operator of a garage or parking
lot has knowingly and voluntarily assumed control, possession,
or custody of the motor vehicle . "366 If a bailment relation-
ship does not exist, the automobile owner will bear the burden
of proving negligence on the part of the operator.'67 The court
of appeals, however, did not discuss the existence of control,
possession, or custody by CPS of Mr. Miller's automobile,
'I, KRS § 189.710 (1971).
"1 No. CA-2091-MR (Ky. App. June 30, 1978), discretionary review granted, 25
Ky. Law Summ. 14 at 27 (Ky. 1978).
16 Id. at 1-2.
i Id. at 2.
', 38 AM. JuR. 2D Garages, and Filling and Parking Stations § 28 (1968).
1.Id.
"' See Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 927, 932 (1966).
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choosing instead' to rely on a 1925 case, Blackburn v.
Depoyster. 6 Blackburn involved a parking garage owner whose
customers parked their own cars and took them out at will,
apparently without relinquishing their car keys. 170 The
Blackburn Court stated that "a garage keeper with whom an
automobile is left for storage is [a] bailee for hire and as such
he is under legal obligation to exercise such ordinary care as a
man of reasonable prudence and discretion would exercise
under like circumstances with respect to his own property.' 17'
The Central Parking court held that the Blackburn decision
required the conclusion that CPS was a bailee 72 and as such
"has the burden of overcoming the prima facie presumption of
negligence which arose out of delivery of the car into its posses-
sion, and loss while in its possession."173 The Central Parking
decision was rendered notwithstanding a Kentucky statute, 74
enacted in 1954, which provides that parking garage operators
who require automobile owners to leave their keys with their
cars are bailees for hire and liable for thefts. This statute was
held not to interfere with application of the principle an-
nounced in Blackburn, because the statute did not specifically
state that garage owners who did not require drivers to relin-
quish their keys were not bailees. 175 Judge Gant, dissenting in
Central Parking, distinguished Blackburn on the ground that
it had involved an oral agreement between the plaintiff and the
owner of the garage, and argued that "the necessary elements
of surrender of control of the chattel and knowledge of posses-
sion of same by the bailee" were not present in the Central
Parking case.
176
It is possible to argue, as the court of appeals elected to do
in Central Parking, that the 1954 statute is not applicable to
this case, because it addresses only the status of parking garage
88 No. CA-2091-MR at 2-3 (Ky. App. June 30, 1978).
" 272 S.W. 398 (Ky. 1925).
,7 See Central Parking Sys. v. Miller, No. CA-2091-MR at 2 (Ky. App. June 30,
1978), discretionary review granted, 25 Ky. Law Summ. 14 at 27 (Ky. 1978).
,71 272 S.W. at 399, quoted in No. CA-2091-MR at 2-3 (Ky. App. June 30, 1978).
,' No. CA-2091-MR at 2 (Ky. App. June 30, 1978).
, Id. at 4.
171 KRS § 189.710 (1971).
"' No. CA-2091-MR at 3 (Ky. App. June 30, 1978).
"' Id. at 5.
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operators who in fact require surrender of automobile keys. The
statute, however, clearly erodes to some extent the general rule
announced in Blackburn that "a garage keeper. . . is a bailee
for hire." With the authority of Blackburn thus in question, the
court of appeals might profitably have undertaken an indepen-
dent analysis of the status of CPS, and considered the extent
to which a parking garage operator who fails to retain a cus-
tomer's keys may nevertheless be deemed to be a bailee for
hire. In this context, whether CPS willingly assumed control of
Mr. Miller's automobile must be the central issue.
Although there is no other authority in Kentucky on this
point, the liability of parking garage operators who do not re-
tain automobile keys has been considered in other jurisdic-
tions; however, the pertinent decisions offer no clear consensus.
In Giles v. Meyers, "I for example, the court stated that custody
of the automobile shifts to the garage owner and a contract of
bailment is created "if once having received an identification
ticket upon entering the lot the driver can only remove his car
from the lot by relinquishing the ticket .... "178 The garage
owner was also held to be a bailee for hire in Hale v. Massachu-
setts Parking Authority,'7' a case in which the automobile
owner had parked and locked his car and kept his keys. The
parking facility was enclosed and an attendant, who was re-
sponsible for stopping each departing car and checking the
tickets presented by the customers, was stationed at the sole
means of egress. The garage owner was held to have exercised
control over the automobiles by controlling their departure
from the facility."0
Other courts, on similar facts, have refused to hold the
parking garage operators liable as bailees for hire. Equity Mu-
tual Insurance Co. v. Affiliated Parking, Inc.,'I concerned the
liability of the owner of an enclosed airport parking lot in which
the automobile owners parked their cars and retained their
keys. The lot was equipped with automatic ticket machines. In
'- 107 N.E.2d 777 (Ohio Misc. 1952).
, Id. at 778.
,7, 265 N.E.2d 494 (Mass. 1970).
' Id. at 495-96; see also Sewall v. Fitz-Inn Auto Parks, Inc., 330 N.E.2d 853, 855
(Mass. App. 1975).
" 448 S.W.2d 909 (Mo. App. 1969).
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Equity Mutual, the court emphasized that the "tickets were
not for the purpose of identifying the specific automobile
bailed, for stating the terms of the bailment, or for any purpose
other than determining the amount of time the car was on the
lot and thus -the amount owed defendant upon removal.
' 182
Consequently, the court found that "the tickets were not such
as would constitute evidence of the control and delivery neces-
sary to create a bailment."'I3 In Wall v. Airport Parking Co., IU
involving a similar self-service parking lot, the parking lot op-
erator was also held not to be a bailee. The court noted that
acceptance of the chattel is a necessary element of a bailment,
and concluded that the operator did not accept any vehicle for
bailment since he had no control over those who used the self-
service lot.""
The differing results in the above cases reflect the conflict-
ing policy considerations inherent in the underlying fact situa-
tion. On the one hand, a parking garage operator who is not
present when an automobile is left on his lot and who does not
accept the keys to that automobile arguably has exercised no
dominion or control over it and should not be responsible for
any loss or damage to it. Further, to subject such operators to
the categorical rule of Blackburn, and label them bailees for
hire by reason of their occupation alone, is to say that society
will not accommodate absentee operation of a parking garage.
Surely, the operators might contend, it is appropriate to permit
individuals to contract to lease merely unattended and un-
guarded space, without incurring additional obligation.
The owner of an automobile, on the other hand, also merits
concern. Presumably, the owner has parked his or her automo-
bile in a parking garage either because there is no other place
in which to leave it or because the garage appears to offer
greater protection against loss than "on-the-street" parking.
By holding that a bailment was not created, the Equity Mutual
and Wall decisions place the burden of proving the negligence
of the garage owner on the customer. As a practical matter, the
112 Id. at 914.
183 Id.
,u 244 N.E.2d 190 (111. 1969).
J' Id. at 193.
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imposition of this burden of proof will often preclude recovery
by an automobile owner who has sustained damage or loss to a
vehicle, since evidence of exercise of care or the lack thereof is
in the parking operator's control.'88 The Giles and Hale deci-
sions, which place on the parking lot operator the burden of
going forward with evidence explaining the loss, clearly offer
greater protection to customers of parking garages and lots. It
should be noted, moreover, that the operator may be better
able to absorb the losses that occur to automobiles on his or her
premises." 7
The decisions discussed above may be distinguished to
some extent by the character of the particular operations. In
the first instance, it may be appropriate to concede that park-
ing in an open lot, which is accessible to the public at all or
most hours of the day and night, presents a discrete situation
in which an automobile owner ought not to be entitled to ex-
pect that an unattended vehicle would be secure from harm.
Under this analysis, the results in Equity Mutual, involving an
airport parking lot, and Wall, involving a "self-service" lot,
may be proper. Where, however, a particular parking facility
creates the impression of offering some measure of security,
because it is located in an enclosed building, locked after cer-
tain hours, or because, although it is not enclosed, it is of suffi-
18, Although it has been stated that, as a general rule, the burdens of pleading and
proof with regard to most facts are imposed on the plaintiff, who generally seeks to
alter the status quo, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EvmENCE 786 (E. Cleary
ed., 2d ed. 1972), courts have often applied the doctrine that, where the facts pertain-
ing to a particular issue lie peculiarly in the knowledge of one party, that party should
bear the burden of proof on that issue. Id. at 787. Thus, the natural tendency to place
the burdens on the party desiring change are sometimes qualified by other factors,
including special policy considerations, fairness, convenience, and the judicial esti-
mate of the probability that a particular event has occurred. Id. at 787-89.
I" Under the "risk-spreading" theory, which has to date received greatest atten-
tion in the area of products liability, it is contended that manufacturers and suppliers,
as a group and as an industry, ought to bear the "inevitable losses which must result
in a complex civilization from the use of their products, because they are in the better
position to do so, and through their prices to pass such losses on to the community at
large." Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099, 1120 (1960); see also Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability
to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. Rav. 791, 800 (1966). Advocates of this theory suggest
that allocation of risk in this fashion could be borne by means of liability insurance.
See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, supra at 1121, for a discussion of the
controversy surrounding the assignment of this role to the insurance structure.
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ciently limited dimensions to permit continuous surveillance
by an exit attendant stationed there, and where no conspicuous
effort is made by the parking facility operator to disabuse po-
tential patrons of this impression, imposition of liability for
loss on the operator, absent a showing of exercise of reasonable
care, would appear to be appropriatess
The Central Parking decision is not the thoroughly rea-
soned opinion required to establish a rule on this issue in Ken-
tucky. Nevertheless, the decision, which requires parking facil-
ity operators to prove that they exercised reasonable care with
respect to automobiles bailed on their premises, offers consid-
erable protection to the vulnerable consumer and is not with-
out support in case law and in social policy.
B. New Home Purchases and the Implied Warranty of
Fitness
Anderson v. Scholz Homes, Inc."9 recounts the tragic tale
of a consumer who should have won, but did not. The Ander-
sons entered into a purchase agreement with Scholz Homes for
a new house " ' and lot for $67,500. The purchase agreement
provided that "[a]ll work shall be done to complete [the]
lu For an excellent discussion of the theories of liability for defective services
rendered in a consumer transaction, see Greenfield, Consumer Protection in Service
Transactions-Implied Warranties and Strict Liability in Tort, 1974 UTAH L. REv. 661,
662-83. A number of arguments have been made for an extension of application of
implied warranty and strict tort liability to service transactions. It may be urged, for
example, that the relationship between the seller and the buyer is the same whether
chattels or services are sold; i.e., the seller is clearly in a better position than the buyer
to determine in advance whether a particular service is defective and, if it is, to alter
it. Similarly, the seller may be in a better position to bear the loss caused by provision
of a defective service, and to distribute the risk of that loss among all of his customers.
Moreover, as in the case of a sale of goods, the consumer of services places a high degree
of reliance on the seller's skill, care and reputation. This reliance is often explicitly
encouraged by sellers, either via advertising or by other promotional devices. Green-
field, Consumer Protection in Service Transactions, supra at 688-89 & nn.117, 118.
Parking garage operators may also implicitly foster such reliance by ostensibly offering
a secure location for temporary storage of motor vehicles. The social and legal policy
which favors giving some weight to consumer expectations, operative in imposing tort
liability for sale of defective goods, is thus arguably applicable to the provision of
services. Absent a clear and conspicuous warning or disclaimer of the effectiveness of
the service-in this case, the security of a parking garage-loss should fall on the seller
of the service, the parking facility operator.
"' 558 S.W.2d 639 (Ky. App. 1977).
, Id. at 640.
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house in new home condition."' About one week after the
purchase agreement had been executed, the Andersons sent a
letter to Scholz Homes specifying numerous items which they
believed Scholz Homes was obligated to complete. " ' Approxi-
mately eight months later, the Andersons filed a complaint
alleging that Scholz Homes had breached its contractual obli-
gation to repair the sagging roof on the new home. The sagging
roof was not one of the items mentioned in the earlier letter to
Scholz Homes.' 3 Nonetheless, the letter was attached as an
exhibit to the Andersons' complaint. "4 The complaint did not
allege ambiguity of contract, unfair representations, or breach
of an implied warranty of quality.'95 Scholz Homes moved to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. The trial court sustained the motion and
dismissed the complaint with prejudice. "8
Notwithstanding the absence of an implied warranty
claim in the Andersons' complaint, the court of appeals al-
lowed the issue to be raised on appeal. The court stated that
"Kentucky seems to still hold to the doctrine of caveat emp-
tor."'' 7 This rule applies 'where no direct representation is
made by the vendor concerning definite facts and the pur-
chaser has sufficient opportunity to observe the condition of
the premises . ..""" Applying the rule of caveat emptor, the
court affirmed the trial court's decision, since the purchase
agreement provided that the "Andersons took the home 'as is,'
after an inspection."'9 9 The inspection by the Andersons re-
vealed some problems which were corrected but did not dis-
close the sagging roof. The court determined that the contrac-
tual obligation of Scholz Homes did not include the repair of
"later-discovered defects. 1'' The result in this case is unfor-
III d.-
102 Id.
113 Id.
'" Brief for Appellee at 1-2, Anderson v. Scholz Homes, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 639 (Ky.
App. 1977).
' 558 S.W.2d at 640-41.
'"Id. at 640.
" Id. at 641.
,M Id., quoting Fannon v. Carden, 240 S.W.2d 101, 103 (Ky. 1951).
Id.
2DO Id.
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tunate, for it appears that both the attorney" ' for the Ander-
sons and the court were unaware of the 1969 Kentucky case of
Crawley v. Terhune.02 In Crawley, the Court abandoned the
majority rule "that there is no implied warranty of fitness,
condition or quality in the sale of a new dwelling. ' '2s3 The Court
announced that "the caveat emptor rule is completely unrealis-
tic and inequitable as applied in the case of the ordinary inex-
perienced buyer of a new house from the professional builder-
seller ... ."I" The minority view was thereafter adopted by
the Crawley Court: "[1ln the sale of a new dwelling by a
builder there is an implied warranty that in its major structural
features the dwelling was constructed in a workmanlike man-
ner and using suitable materials." 2°e
C. Statute of Limitations Under the Truth-in-Lending Act
The Federal Truth-in-Lending Act"0 8 requires that credi-
tors make certain enumerated disclosures to borrowers in
connection with consumer credit transactions. 2 7 Creditors who
"I The Andersons' attorney raised the implied warranty issue on appeal, citing
only the Texas case of Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968). Brief for
Appellant at 4-5, Anderson v. Scholz Homes, Inc., 558 S.W.2d 639 (Ky. App. 1977).
22 437 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1969). One possible explanation for the omission of any
reference to Crawley in the briefs or opinion in Anderson is that the indexing system
of the Kentucky Digest is unreliable in the field of homeowners' remedies against
builders. For example, the "key-number" category assigned to Fannon v. Carden is
"Vendor & Purchaser: Application of doctrine of caveat emptor-37(1)." 18A
KENTUCKY DIGEST 349 (1962). In Anderson v. Scholz Homes the assigned category is
"Vendor & Purchaser: Subject Matter-Appurtenances-67." Id. at 17 (Supp. 1978).
However, the category assigned to the implied warranty issue in Crawley v. Terhune
is "Contracts: Warranties-205." 5 KENTUCKY DIGEST 155 (Supp. 1978). Consequently,
research of the cases in the "Vendor & Purchaser" category indicates that the doctrine
of caveat emptor is still applicable in Kentucky.
20 437 S.W.2d at 745.
204 Id.
200 Id.
20 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81 (1976).
2" The disclosure requirements apply to both closed-end credit transactions, such
as a single loan, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1638, 1639 (1976), and open-end credit plans, such as
revolving charge accounts, 15 U.S.C. § 1637 (1976). The type of information required
to be disclosed includes: the annual percentage rate of interest, the total amount of
any finance charge, and the principal amount financed. Disclosures are regulated not
only as to content, but also as to form: disclosures must be made clearly, conspicu-
ously, in meaningful sequence and in the terminology prescribed by the Act and by
Federal Reserve Board Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(a) (1978).
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fail to comply with these disclosure requirements are liable for
a penalty, limited under the Act to twice the amount of the
finance charge in connection with the transaction, but not less
than $100 nor more than $1000.205 A successful plaintiff is also
entitled to recover the costs of the action together with reasona-
ble attorney's fees.
209
The Act expressly provides that an action based on a fail-
ure to comply with the disclosure requirements must be
brought "within one year from the date of the occurrence of the
violation." 10 Although the courts have had little difficulty in
construing this provision to bar actions by a consumer plaintiff
more than one year after a violation of the Act by a creditor,
211
there has been less agreement as to the applicability of this
statute of limitations in other contexts. Specifically, when a
creditor has sued in a state court to recover an unpaid debt,
and the debtor has filed a counterclaim based on Truth-in-
Lending Act violations which occurred more than one year
prior to the suit, the courts have been divided on the issue
whether the counterclaim should be barred by the Act's limita-
tions statute.
Courts which have held that such counterclaims are
barred have often done so summarily.212 Other courts have
emphasized the policy of the Truth-in-Lending Act, noting a
manifested congressional intent to establish a uniform period
20 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A)(ii) (1976).
15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (1976).
20 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1974). As a general rule, when the violation occurs in a
"closed-end" transaction, it is held to have "occurred" when the creditor fails to make
the required disclosures at the time required, i.e. when the agreement is consummated,
as opposed to the time the violation is discovered. See, e.g., Stevens v. Rock Springs
Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 307, 309 (10th Cir. 1974). The theory that the violation is a
continuing one has been rejected by the majority of courts. See, e.g., Wachtel v. West,
476 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); Munson v. Orrin E. Thomp-
son Homes, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 152 (D. Minn. 1974); see generally, Annot., 36 A.L.R.
Fed. 657, 670 (1978); but see Postow v. Oriental Bldg. Ass'n, 390 F. Supp. 1130 (D.D.C.
1975), for an example of the minority position. Moreover, repetitions of the violation,
such as monthly billing statements, do not extend the period of limitations. See Fenton
v. Citizens Say. Ass'n, 400 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Mo. 1975).
"I See, e.g., Stevens v. Rock Springs Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 307 (10th Cir. 1974);
Wachtel v. West, 476 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); Fenton
v. Citizens Say. Ass'n. 400 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Mo. 1975).
212 See, e.g., Phil Mechanic Constr. Co. v. Gibson, 226 S.E.2d 837 (N.C. App.
1976).
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for enforcement of actions for violations," 3 and suggesting that
it would be improper to extend the time limit merely because
a state forum was involved.21' It has been urged, moreover, that
while the Truth-in-Lending Act was intended to protect con-
sumers, it should not be used to thwart the valid claims of
creditors.15
The Kentucky Court of Appeals considered this issue in
the recent case of Empire Finance Co. v. Ewing,26 and held
that the one-year limitations period was not applicable to a
consumer defense, based on TILA violations, in the nature of
"recoupment."21 7 Melvin Ewing, the debtor on an installment
note executed to Empire Finance Company on September 25,
1975, was the defendant in Empire's action to recover the un-
paid balance due on the note after default. Ewing alleged that
Empire had failed to comply in numerous respects with the
disclosure requirements of the Act, and claimed that he was
entitled to a "set-off" of $398 against the $484.38 due on the
debt. Ewing counterclaimed for the $398 and for attorney's fees
and costs of the action.218 The trial court found that Empire
had violated the Truth-in-Lending Act, in failing to indicate on
its disclosure statement that the security interest retained by
M, "Truth-in-Lending is a federal law which should be uniformly applied to con-
sumers in all states." Ken-Lu Enterprises, Inc. v. Neal, 223 S.E.2d 831, 833 (N.C.
App.), cert. denied, 225 S.E.2d 829 (N.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976).
Congressional intent to maintain an inflexible one-year statute of limitations on
TILA actions has also been inferred by some courts from a 1974 amendment to the Act.
This amendment provides that a person may not offset any amount for which a creditor
is potentially liable to him under the Act against a debt owed to such creditor "unless
the amount of the creditor's liability to such person has been determined by judgment
of a court of competent jurisdiction in an action to which such person was a party."
15 U.S.C. § 1640(h) (1974). Public Loan Co. v. Hyde, 390 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1977); Ken-
Lu Enterprises, Inc. v. Neal, 223 S.E.2d 831 (N.C. App.), cert. denied, 225 S.E.2d 829
(N.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976). Others have urged that this provision is
intended only to preclude a debtor's "self-help" deduction of penalties not adjudicated
against a creditor. See note 223 infra and accompanying text.
"I In Public Loan Co. v. Hyde, 390 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1977), the court rejected coun-
terclaims based on violations of the Truth-in-Lending Act, and noted that it was
consistent, if federal courts lacked jurisdiction over such claims after one year, to
similarly limit the jurisdiction of the state court.
I's E.g., Ken-Lu Enterprises, Inc. v. Neal, 223 S.E.2d 831 (N.C. App.), cert.
denied, 225 S.E.2d 829 (N.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976).
22, 558 S.W.2d 619 (Ky. App. 1977).
227 Id. at 622.
218 Id. at 620.
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Empire in Ewing's after-acquired property was limited to prop-
erty acquired within ten days after the date the loan was
made.219 The set-off claimed by Ewing was allowed, and Em-
pire appealed.
The appellate court, affirming the decision below,20 re-
jected Empire's argument that the Truth-in-Lending Act es-
tablished a one-year statute of limitation21 applicable to both
affirmative actions to recover a penalty for violation of the Act
and to debtor defenses seeking to assert the penalty by way of
set-off, counterclaim or recoupment. 22 The appellee, Ewing,
had argued that the Act was intended to bar only affirmative
actions under the Act more than one year after a violation had
occurred and to preclude debtor "self-help" via unilateral de-
duction from the debt of a penalty the debtor deemed to be due
him under the Act.m Noting that there was support for both
"I Id. at 621. Federal Reserve Board Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(a)(5) (1978),
requires that the disclosure statement contain a description or identification of the
type of security interest retained by the creditor, if any. Although it is not improper
to retain a security interest in after-acquired property of the debtor, if the debtor is a
consumer such after-acquired interests are limited to property acquired within 10 days
from the date that the loan is made. U.C.C. § 9-204(4) (1962 version); KRS § 355.9-
204(4)(b) (1960). In light of this limitation, it has been held that a security interest in
"all after-acquired property," without an indication of the restrictions on this interest,
constitutes a violation of the Truth-in-Lending Act. E.g., Tinsman v. Moline Benefi-
cial Finance Co., 531 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1976); Johnson v. Associates Finance, Inc., 369
F. Supp. 1121 (S.D. Ill. 1974). This rule has been unofficially adopted in Kentucky,
Stone v. Modem Loan Co., Inc., No. C75-0033L(B) (June 2, 1976), and was applied
by the Court of Appeals in Empire. 558 S.W.2d at 621.
22 Error was found, however, in the trial court's failure to award the creditor pre-
judgment interest, and interest after judgment at the statutory rate. The judgment for
Empire (albeit reduced in amount to the extent claimed by Ewing) was amended to
provide for such interest. 558 S.W.2d at 622.
221 Empire based its claim that a one-year statute of limitations applied to all
TILA claims upon a reading of sections 130(e) and 130(h) of the Act. 15 U.S.C. §§
1640(e), (h) (1976).
2n 558 S.W.2d at 621-22.
m Id.
To hold otherwise, appellee contends, would seriously hamper the purpose
of the penalty provision since in most instances borrowers would not become
aware of a violation of disclosure provisions until some legal action was
commenced by the lender to recover the money lent. Lenders could, there-
fore, avoid assertion of the penalty by a borrower by simply waiting more
than one year to take action.
Id. It should be noted that, even if no such bad faith may be imputed to lenders, a
construction of the limitations provision to bar any claim for a penalty more than one
year from the violation would appear to reward debtors who default immediately in
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positions in the case law of other jurisdictions, Tm and that such
decisions thus furnished little guidance for resolution of the
issue, the court turned to Kentucky law. Controlling effect was
given to the case of Liter v. Hoagland25 and its progeny,2"
holding that, under Kentucky practice, limitations periods do
not preclude the assertion of "'mere defenses' arising out of
the transaction connected with a plaintiff's claim. ' ' 22 To
apply Liter, the court further found that the defense raised by
Ewing was in fact one "arising out of" the transaction and not
"extrinsic" thereto.=
The Empire decision is noteworthy primarily as a state-
ment of Kentucky's position on an issue on which state courts
have been sharply divided. 229 The refusal of the Kentucky
Court of Appeals to bar claims for Truth-in-Lending Act viola-
tions asserted by defendants in debt collection actions, when
the defense of recoupment is raised more than one year from
the date the violation occurred, is clearly a boon to consumers.
Because they often lack commercial sophistication, consumer
debtors may be unaware of the protection afforded them under
Federal law until well after the one-year period allowed for
affirmative actions to enforce their rights has expired. Surely,
it may be argued, the credit information to which such a con-
sumer is entitled under the Act does not lose its relevance to
their credit obligations and penalize those who make a good faith effort to pay their
debts, but become unable to do so more than one year after the date of contracting.
Legislative history supports the argument that Section 130(h), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(h)
(1976), was designed to prevent "self-help" deductions of penalties, and thus does not
mandate exclusion of counterclaims or claims in the nature of set-off or recoupment.
S. REP. No. 93-278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1973).
2 558 S.W.2d at 622. Compare, e.g., Public Loan Co. v. Hyde, 390 N.Y.S.2d 971
(1977) (counterclaims barred), with Termplan Mid-City, Inc. v. Laughlin, 333 So.2d
738 (La. App. 1976) (time-barred claim of TILA violations may be asserted as set-off).
" 204 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1947).
m See, e.g., Armstrong v. Logsdon, 469 S.W.2d 342 (Ky. 1971).
2 558 S.W.2d at 622, citing Liter v. Hoagland, 204 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1947).
2u "The duties and resultant civil liability of a lender arise out of the loan transac-
tion itself. They are imposed by law upon the lender in the making of such a contract
and, in effect, they become a part of the contract." 558 S.W.2d at 622. A contrary result
was urged in Empire, and had been adopted by other courts. E.g., Ken-Lu Enterprises,
Inc. v. Neal, 223 S.E.2d 831 (N.C. App.), cert. denied, 225 S.E.2d 829 (N.C.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976).
211 See, e.g., notes 211-15 and 224 supra and accompanying text; notes 231-34
infra and accompanying text.
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him simultaneously with the expiration of that period. Thus,
to hold that even a defense in the nature of recoupment or set-
off, based on TILA violations, is barred after one year is to
permit a creditor to reap the benefits of an unlawful contract,
and to frustrate the essential purpose and policies of the Act.M
It is interesting to note, however, that a number of state
courts allowing TILA violations to be raised as defenses have,
as in Empire, based their decisions upon a helpful peculiarity
of state law. For example, in Wood Acceptance Co. v. King," '
a state statute allowed the defendant to plead as a set-off or
counterclaim a claim otherwise barred by the pertinent statute
of limitations. 2 2 Similarly, in First National City Bank v.
Drake,23 the court was aided by a New York statute authoriz-
ing assertion of time-barred causes of action as a set-off or
defense against an obligation out of which the defense arose.2i
That courts have been compelled to look to state statutory
or case law to reach the conclusion that TILA-based defenses
are not barred explains the lack of uniform result in the deci-
sions on this issue and illustrates the inadequacy and ambigu-
ity of the TILA. Although there is little legislative history to
illuminate the congressional purpose underlying the one-year
2 The intent of Congress in enacting the disclosure requirements under the Fed-
eral Consumer Credit Protection Act was to ensure full disclosure of credit charges in
order to permit consumers to "comparison-shop" for credit and to make intelligent
judgments as to the reasonableness of the credit charges imposed.H.R. REP. No. 1040,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1967), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
1962, 1962-63.
231 309 N.E.2d 403 (ll. App. 1974).
212 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 17 (1971), cited in Wood Acceptance Co. v. King, 309
N.E.2d 403, 404 (Ill. App. 1974).
233 [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] CONS. CrED. GUIDE (CCH) 1 98,939 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1973).
231 By rule of civil procedure in New York, defenses or counterclaims arising out
of the same transaction as that giving rise to the complaint are not barred by the
pertinent statute of limitations in all instances:
A defense or counterclaim is not barred if it was not barred at the time the
claims asserted in the complaint were interposed, except that if the defense
or counterclaim arose from the transactions, occurrences, or series of transac-
tions or occurrences, upon which a claim asserted in the complaint depends,
it is not barred to the extent of the demand in the complaint notwithstanding
that it was barred at the time the claims asserted in the complaint were
interposed.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 203(c) (McKinney) (emphasis added).
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statute of limitations in the Truth-in-Lending Act,25 the Act
was clearly intended to safeguard consumerssa and to be en-
forced by means of private actions for the civil penalty pro-
vided.? To further these policies and to avoid inequitable re-
sults and disparate holdings in different states, clarification of
the Act is required. Pending that clarification, courts must
continue to speculate on the proper application of the limita-
tions provision, endeavoring with little guidance to realize the
objective of fairness to consumers.
D. Consumer Legislation
Two acts of the Kentucky legislature, approved on March
30, 1978, provide significant protection for the interests of con-
sumers by regulating the distribution and sale of "business
opportunities," 2m and the use of "negative option plans"' 9 in
the sale of merchandise.
1. Business Opportunities
A new section of KRS Chapter 367, an Act relating to
business opportunities, defines a "business opportunity" as
"an opportunity to offer, sell or distribute through a distribu-
tion device goods or services supplied in whole or in part by the
offeror" when the offeror acquires an initial required invest-
ment of at least $500, and when the offeror has made certain
specified representations to the consumer/investor concerning
m "Although our research into the Congressional hearings on the enactment of the
Federal Truth in Lending Bill fails to disclose the purpose behind the one year filing
period, we note that the Act is intended to safeguard the consumer in connection with
the utilization of credit .... " Wood Acceptance Co. v. King, 309 N.E.2d 403, 405
(Ill. App. 1974).
2 Id.
2 Id. "[Tihe enforcement of the Act is accomplished largely through the institu-
tion of civil actions. For this reason, no provision was made for investigative or enforce-
ment machinery at the federal level on the assumption that the civil penalty section
would secure substantial compliance with the Act." Id., citing S. REP. No. 392, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1967).
' KRS §§ 367.801-.990 (Supp. 1978). Legislation regulating the sale of recreation
and retirement use land was also added to the Kentucky consumer protection laws in
1978. This legislation, not discussed in this article, may be found at KRS §§ 367.470-
.486 (Supp. 1978).
KRS §§ 367.570-.585 (Supp. 1978).
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the anticipated profitability of the opportunity.24 The sale of
business opportunities is declared by the Act to be unlawful
unless the seller-offeror first files a form of registration state-
ment with the state division of securities, and furnishes $25,000
bond "to insure the veracity of all statements contained in the
registration . . . ."2 The filed registration must contain cer-
tain information specified in the Act, including disclosure of
the offeror's trade names, and home addresses and home tele-
phone numbers of the company offering the business opportun-
ity, and of any directors, chief executive officers and sales rep-
resentatives. Disclosure of additional information pertaining to
the history of the offeror's business is also required, including,
for example, the names, addresses and telephone numbers of
all persons who have purchased business opportunities from
the offeror within the preceding two years; a statement of any
civil or criminal judgment against the offeror; a statement of
any litigation to which the offeror or its officers, directors or
agents have been a party within the past seven-year period;
and whether the offeror has been adjudicated a bankrupt
within that period.?A
The Act requires an offeror to furnish and display to any
potential consumer/investor a copy of the filed disclosure state-
ment,2a and to provide the prospective consumer/investor with
a notice stating that registration does not imply, directly or
indirectly, that the business opportunity or any of the activities
240 KRS § 367.801(5) (Supp. 1978). Specifically, a "business opportunity" is
brought within the scope of the Act when:
(a) The offeror obtains an initial required consideration of not less than five
hundred dollars ($500) from the purchase or lease of the business opportunity
or inventory associated therewith; and
(b) The offeror has represented that the consumer/investor will earn, can
earn or is likely to earn a gross or net profit in excess of the initial required
investment paid by the consumer/investor for the business opportunity; and
(c) The offeror has represented that he has knowledge of the relevant mar-
ket and that the market demand will enable the consumer/investor to earn
a profit from the business opportunity; or the offeror has represented that
.. .assistance will be given to the consumer/investor in finding locations for
the use or operation of the business opportunity. . . or that the offeror will
buy back or is likely to buy back any product. . ..
Id.
2- KRS § 367.815(2) (Supp. 1978).
24 KRS § 367.805(1) (Supp. 1978).
243 KRS § 367.813(1) (Supp. 1978).
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of representatives selling such business opportunities are ap-
proved by the Commonwealth of Kentucky."' Moreover, notice
of a purchaser's right to cancel within 30 days after the as-
sumption of any financial obligation must be provided in the
form and manner specified by the Act.2 5 In addition to this
right of cancellation within 30 days, a purchaser of a business
opportunity is entitled, under the Act, to cancel at any time if
the offeror has failed (a) to provide locations as represented; (b)
to deliver goods or merchandising materials as represented; or
(c) "to comply with Section 5(1)" of the Act, pertaining to
disclosure of the offeror's registration number in any advertis-
ing materials. 28 The Act specifies the manner in which cancel-
lation may be accomplished2"' and sets forth the rights and
obligations of the purchaser and offeror upon cancellation.
2 8
The enforcement provisions of the Act are broad, designed
to permit both governmental and private litigation to assure
compliance. The attorney general is authorized to seek a re-
straining order or a temporary or permanent injunction prohib-
iting any offer or sale of a business opportunity whenever the
attorney general "has reason to believe" that the offer or sale
is being made in violation of the Act.Y' An offeror or seller of a
business opportunity who makes false, misleading or deceptive
representations is also civilly liable to the purchaser of the
business opportunity for an amount "equal to the sum of [the
purchaser's] actual damages or . . . ($1,500), whichever is
greater, as well as the cost of the action together with reasona-
24 KRS § 367.813(2) (Supp. 1978).
2u KRS 99 367.819(1), (5) (Supp. 1978).
246 KRS § 367.819(1) (Supp. 1978).
24 Although a purchaser's notice of cancellation need not be in any particular
form, it must be in writing and, if cancellation is made after more than thirty (30) days,
it should specify the violation on the basis of which cancellation is demanded. KRS
§§ 367.819(2), (4) (Supp. 1978). See also KRS § 367.819(3) (Supp. 1978) (notice of
cancellation, when mailed, is deemed to be given when deposited in the mail, properly
addressed and with postage prepaid).
214 The seller must refund to the purchaser any payments made and must termi-
nate all financial obligations created in connection with the transaction within 15 days
after the date of the purchaser's notice of cancellation. KRS § 367.819(7) (Supp. 1978).
A cancelling purchaser must return any products or inventory provided by the seller
"in substantially as good condition as when received by the buyer." KRS § 367.819(9)
(Supp. 1978).
243 KRS § 367.817 (Supp. 1978).
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ble attorney's fees . . -."I Finally, the Act establishes a
scheme of fines and penalties for violation of its various provi-
sions.2sl Offerors who have "continuously operated a business
from a physical location in Kentucky. . . for twelve (12) con-
secutive months prior to the time of the offer" and those who
sell or offer to sell "package franchises"' 2 are exempted from
the provisions of the Act.
153
2. Negative Option Plans
A second piece of consumer protection legislation regulates
the use of "negative option plans," by which merchandise an-
nounced in advance is sent to a subscriber unless, within a
specified period of time, the subscriber instructs the seller not
to send it.2s4 Such plans are used regularly by book clubs, re-
cord clubs, and collectors' societies which offer periodic oppor-
tunities to purchase stamps, coins or other special merchan-
dise. This Act sets forth a number of detailed requirements and
declares that a failure to comply with these requirements in
connection with the use of any negative option plan is an
"unfair, false, misleading and deceptive practice as prohibited
by KRS 367.170. .,,"55 entitling the attorney general to resort
to the remedies and enforcement powers provided for violation
of the consumer protection laws generally.2m The new Act re-
KRS § 367.815(1) (Supp. 1978).
"' KRS § 367.990 (Supp. 1978).
212 The term "package franchise" is defined as an agreement in which:
(a) The franchisee sells goods or services which must meet the quality
standards of the franchisor; and
(b) The franchisee is required by the franchisor to establish a retail busi-
ness location, not to include the home or residence of the franchisee, to be
used primarily for the sale of the goods or services under the trade name of
the franchisor; and
(c) The franchisor exerts or has authority to exert a significant degree of
control over the franchisee's business organization, promotional activities,
management marketing plan, or business affairs.
KRS § 367.801(7) (Supp. 1978).
2m KRS § 367.807 (Supp. 1978).
2" KRS § 367.570(1) (Supp. 1978). Solicitation and subscription sales of printed
material such as magazines, encyclopedias, books and Bibles are also subject to regula-
tion pursuant to 1978 amendment of the Kentucky consumer protection laws. See KRS
§§ 367.510-.540 (Supp. 1978).
m KRS § 367.575(1) (Supp. 1978).
211 KRS § 367.575(2) (Supp. 1978). The Kentucky consumer protection laws au-
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quires clear and conspicuous disclosure, in any promotional
material, of the material terms of any negative option plan,
including:
(a) That aspect of the plan under which the subscriber
must notify the seller, in the manner provided for by the
seller, if he does not wish to purchase the selection; (b) Any
obligation assumed by the subscriber to purchase a minimum
quantity of merchandise; (c) The right of a contract-complete
subscriber to cancel his membership at any time; (d)
Whether billing charges will include an amount for postage
and handling; (e) A disclosure indicating that the subscriber
will be provided with at least ten (10) days in which to mail
any form, contained in or accompanying an announcement
identifying the selection, to the seller; (f) A disclosure that
the seller will credit the return of any selections sent to a
subscriber, and guarantee to the postal service or the subscri-
ber postage to return such selections to the seller when the
announcement and form are not received by the subscriber
in time to afford him at least ten (10) days in which to mail
his form to the seller; (g) The frequency with which the an-
nouncements and forms will be sent to the subscriber, and
the maximum number of announcements and forms which
will be sent to him during a 12-month period.27
The Act specifies the contents of the announcement and the
reply form to be sent to each subscriber before any selection is
sent, and mandates that this information and form be mailed
within a period allowing the subscriber at least ten days in
which to reply by mailing the form.2ss
Finally, the Act contains a list of acts prohibited in
thorize the attorney general to seek restraining orders and injunctions prohibiting
unlawful methods, acts or practices, KRS § 367.190 (1972); to accept assurances of
voluntary compliance with respect to any method, act or practice deemed to be unlaw-
ful, KRS § 367.230 (1972); and to make investigations, utilizing the subpoena power,
to ascertain the existence of violations of the consumer protection laws, KRS §§
367.240, 367.250 (1972). Courts may "make such additional orders or judgments as may
be necessary to restore to any person in interest any moneys or property" acquired by
unlawful methods, acts or practices. Such orders may include, for example, the ap-
pointment of a receiver or the revocation of a license or certificate authorizing the
conduct of business in the state. KRS § 367.200 (1972). Finally, private actions to
enforce the consumer protection laws are sanctioned. KRS § 367.220 (1972).
KRS § 367.580(1) (Supp. 1978).
KRS §§ 367.580(2), (3) (Supp. 1978).
1978-791
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
connection with the use of a negative option plan. Refusal to
credit a subscriber with the return of a particular selection and
to guarantee postage adequate to permit such return violates
the Act when, under the statutory language, a right to return
the merchandise exists.2 Failure to notify a subscriber of the
existence of a right to return a selection,20 unexcused failure to
ship bonus or introductory material in a timely manner,28 ' fail-
ure to terminate promptly the membership of a "contract-
complete subscriber"28 2 upon his written request,2" and ship-
ment of substituted merchandise for that ordered by a subscri-
ber without the subscriber's express consent" are all prohib-
ited by the Act.
The use of negative option plans has become increasingly
widespread, and has been a source of numerous problems for
consumers. Even when the rights provided by the new Act are
represented as incorporated in a plan's promotional materials,
consumer demands in exercise of those rights may fall, consis-
tently and over extended periods of time, on the plan's unres-
ponsive computer. The above-described legislation, broadening
as it does the definition of an "unfair, false, misleading and
deceptive practice," establishes minimum standards of fair-
ness to consumers in connection with the use of such plans, and
provides a mechanism by which such standards may be prac-
ticably enforced.
2 9 A right to return a particular selection exists when:
(a) The selection is sent to a subscriber whose form indicating that he does
not want to receive the selection was received by the seller by the return date
or was mailed by the subscriber by the mailing date;
(b) Such form is received by the seller after the return date, but has been
mailed by the subscriber and postmarked at least three (3) days prior to the
return date;
(c) Prior to the date of shipment of such selection, the seller has received
from a contract-complete subscriber, a written notice of cancellation of
membership...;
(d) The announcement and form are not received by the subscriber in time
to afford him at least ten (10) days in which to mail his form.
KRS § 367.585(1) (Supp. 1978).
250 KRS § 367.585(2)(a) (Supp. 1978).
261 KRS § 367.585(2)(b) (Supp. 1978).
2 A "contract-complete subscriber" is defined as a subscriber "who has pur-
chased the minimum quantity of merchandise required by the terms of membership
in a negative option plan." KRS § 367.570(3) (Supp. 1978).
20 KRS § 367.585(2)(c) (Supp. 1978).
264 KRS § 367.585(2)(d) (Supp. 1978).
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EPiLOGUE
Most of the Kentucky decisions discussed in this survey
article were rendered by the court of appeals. It should be
noted, however, that the Kentucky Supreme Court has granted
discretionary review in several of these cases. Practitioners
should, therefore, continue to supervise the status of the cases
discussed in this survey, to determine whether the Supreme
Court approves or discards the reasoning of the courts of ap-
peals.

